

REREADING SAYYID QUṬB'S ISLAMISM AND POLITICAL CONCEPT OF *AL-ḤĀKIMIYYAH*: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

***Muktafi[#], Abdullah Haq Al Haidary^{**}, Mukhammad
Zamzami^{*}***

^{*}Faculty of Ushuluddin and Philosophy. Sunan Ampel
State Islamic University Surabaya. Jalan A. Yani 117.
Surabaya. East Java. Indonesia.

^{**}State Islamic University Sayyid Ali Rahmatullah
Tulungagung. Jl. Major Sujadi No. 24. Tulungagung. East
Java. Indonesia.

Email: [#]muktafi.sahal@uinsby.ac.id

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Abstract

This article analyzes Islamism and Sayyid Quṭb's political concept of *al-Ḥākimiyyah*. According to Quṭb, Islamism is a political structure and a part of the Muslim faith. Employing a theoretical perspective of the functions of interpretation proposed by Jorge J. E. Gracia, this analysis found out that Quṭb's *al-Ḥākimiyyah* is the most vital concept behind the phenomenon around global religious fundamentalism. This theory promotes a political structure believed to be emanated from God's will and not merely from the people's sovereignty. The idea of *al-Ḥākimiyyah* ignores any laws and systems of values made by human being. In other words, people who attempt to go against the theory will be considered rebelling against the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth and assumed to be the enemy. By analyzing through the functional theory of text interpretation of Quṭb's ideology, this article challenges the narrative of Quṭb's Islamism and *al-Ḥākimiyyah*, which presents a very arrogant face of Islam and cannot accept differences in thought. Islamism, through the framework of *al-Ḥākimiyyah*, is a political structure,

not a faith structure. Nevertheless, this kind of Islamism is not merely political, but what Bassam Tibi called religionized politics. Quṭb's ideological proposal is a real example of the religious doctrine of global fundamentalism. Quṭb's ideas are the specific interpretation of Islam but not necessarily Islam: it is a political ideology different from Islam's teaching.

Keywords: *Al-Hākimiyyah*; Islamism; fundamentalism; Sayyid Quṭb.

Khulasah

Makalah ini menganalisis Islamisme dan konsep politik Sayyid Quṭb mengenai *al-Hākimiyyah*. Menurut Quṭb, Islamisme adalah struktur politik dan bahagian kepercayaan umat Islam. Dengan menggunakan perspektif teori fungsi tafsiran yang dikemukakan oleh Jorge J. E. Gracia, analisis ini mendapati bahawa *al-Hākimiyyah* Quṭb adalah konsep yang paling penting di sebalik fenomena sekitar fundamentalisme agama global. Teori ini mempromosikan struktur politik yang dipercayai berasal dari kehendak Tuhan dan bukan hanya dari kedaulatan rakyat. Idea *al-Hākimiyyah* mengabaikan sebarang undang-undang dan sistem nilai yang dibuat oleh manusia. Dengan kata lain, orang yang berusaha menentang teori tersebut akan dianggap memberontak terhadap al-Qur'an dan Hadith serta dianggap sebagai musuh. Dengan penganalisan melalui teori fungsional tafsiran teks ideologi Quṭb, makalah ini mencabar narasi Islamisme Quṭb dan *al-Hākimiyyah*, yang menampilkan wajah Islam yang sangat sombong dan tidak dapat menerima perbezaan pemikiran. Islamisme, melalui kerangka *al-Hākimiyyah*, adalah struktur politik, bukan struktur kepercayaan. Walaupun begitu, Islamisme seperti ini tidak hanya bersifat politik, tetapi apa yang disebut Bassam Tibi sebagai agama yang berpolitik. Cadangan ideologi Quṭb adalah contoh sebenar doktrin agama fundamentalisme global. Idea Quṭb ialah tafsiran Islam yang khusus tetapi tidak

semestinya Islam: ideologi politik berbeza dengan ajaran Islam.

Kata kunci: *Al-Ḥākimiyyah*; Islamisme; fundamentalisme; Sayyid Quṭb.

Introduction

Islamism-Muslim groups who believe that Islam is pure religion and has to be the only formal system in a state¹ is an understanding of Islam as a formal system of a state, which is a so-called Islamic state. Islamism's primary goal is to build a structure supporting Islamic governance and mobilizing the ummah to achieve totalitarian authority called *al-niẓām al-Islāmī*.² Islamism or political Islam (*al-Islām al-Siyāsī*), as they understood it, appears as a response to the existence of modernity, broadly understood as the product of Western civilization, which has failed to accommodate the interests of Islam. A famous slogan of the Islamists is "Islam is the solution" (*al-Islām huwa al-ḥall*). They insist that any ideologies outside Islam, such as democracy, socialism, communism, and secularism, are Western products incompatible with the Islamic world.³

An Islamist attitude is a form of criticism toward the rulers in most Muslim countries who do not implement Islamic sharia. The Islamists consider such rulers as the wrongdoers who prefer the Western system and thoughts rather than affirming the Islamic governance model. Starting from the idea of pan-Islamism (*al-waḥdah al-*

¹ Abd. A'la et al., "Islamism in Madura: From Religious Symbolism to Authoritarianism", *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 12(2) (2018), 159-194. DOI: 10.15642/JIIS.2018.12.2.159-194.

² Bassam Tibi, *Islam dan Islamisme*, terj. Alfathir Adlin (Bandung: Mizan, 2016), 292.

³ Muhamad Ali, "Islamisme (*al-Islāmiyya*) dan Post-Islamisme (*Ba'da al-Islāmiyya*): Menelaah Pilihan-pilihan Politik Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia", Paper presented at the Seminar "Post-Islamisme" in the Philosophy Major, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 2011.

Islāmiyyah) by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muslim scholars such as Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (Muḥammad 'Abduh's student), and Ḥasan al-Bannā brought the idea. They manifested it into the establishment of a phenomenal organization, namely al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (Muslim Brotherhood).

After Ḥasan al-Bannā died in 1949 and the second leader Ḥasan Huḍaybī, the leadership was carried by Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966). Right under his leadership, the Muslim Brotherhood has moved into a more radical manifestation. Responding to the reformation of Islamic political thoughts against the Western hegemony, despotic Egypt rulers, and the liberal Muslims in the country, Quṭb resisted any westernization of ideologies in the Arab-Islamic lands.⁴ He formulated some agendas of political Islam in his several works such as *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq* and *al-'Adālah al-Ijtimā'īyyah fī al-Islām*.⁵ His political ideologies have influenced many anti-Westernization movements in Muslim countries, such as al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn in Egypt and al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Within the Indonesian context, the soft version of Quṭb's idealism can be observed among others in the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party/PKS). There have been such studies that confirm this linkage as the book *Islamist Parties and Political Normalization in the Muslim World* edited by Quinn Mecham and Julie Chernov Hwang,⁶ the work of M. Imdadun Rahmat entitled *Ideologi Politik PKS: Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen* (Political Ideology of PKS: From the

⁴ Sayyid Quṭb, *Fī al-Tārīkh: Fikrah wa Minhāj* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1987), 68.

⁵ Sayyid Quṭb, *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1992).

⁶ Quinn Mecham and Julie Chernov Hwang eds., *Islamist Parties and Political Normalization in the Muslim World* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

Campus Mosque to the Parliament Building),⁷ and Masdar Hilmy's work entitled *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism*.⁸

Meanwhile, in an extreme version, Quṭb's thinking became the main basis for the movement of the al-Qaeda group. The connection can be traced among others from the figure of Muḥammad Quṭb, the younger brother of Sayyid Quṭb. After the riots caused by the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Nāṣir, Muḥammad Quṭb along with some other members of the Ikhwān was imprisoned by the regime. Once he was freed from the jail, he moved to Saudi Arabia and became a professor in Islamic Studies, and continued disseminating his brother's ideas. One of his students is 'Aymān al-Ḍawāhirī, a former member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad which since the late 1970s had been classified as a terrorist group by the Egyptian government, the British government, and the United Nations.⁹ From the history of the movement, we can infer

⁷ M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Ideologi Politik PKS: Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2015).

⁸ Masdar Hilmy, *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2010).

⁹ Previously, Maḥfouz 'Azzām, Ḍawāhirī's uncle, introduced him to Sayyid Quṭb. Ḍawāhirī expressed his admiration of Sayyid Quṭb in *Knight under the Prophet's Banner*. Ḍawāhirī also transmitted Quṭb's thoughts to his pupils, one of them was 'Usāmah bin Lādin (Osama Laden). Osama has been reported to regularly attends Muḥammad Quṭb's weekly lectures at King Abdul Aziz University and had been a long-time admirer of Quṭb. Osama and several other militant Sunni figures later formed an organization, named Al-Qaeda, which had a reputation for its terror both in the Middle East and North America. Osama died in 2011, but Al-Qaeda is still alive today under Ḍawāhirī's leadership. See, among others, 'Abū Ḥājir al-Lībī, *al-Harakah al-Islāmiyyah bayn al-Shaykh al-Mujāhid Sayyid Quṭb wa al-Shaykh Usāmah bin Lādin* (n.p.: Majmū'at al-Ittiṣāl al-Barādiyyah, 2009); Agnes Setyowati, *Ideologi Islam, Barat dan Amerika: Potret Sejarah Global Kepentingan dalam Pertarungan Diskursif* (Yogyakarta: Suluh Media, 2017), 50-51.

that there has been a genealogy of violence in Qutb's political Islam theory given birth to many hard-line Muslims all over the world.

One of Qutb's thoughts on Islamism is the concept of *al-Hākimiyyah*. The idea insists that sovereignty belongs to God. God is the only creator of laws and the laws are the guidance of life in all aspects of human lives.¹⁰ In this case, we need a contemporary approach and methodology to understand Qutb's Islamism and his concept of *al-Hākimiyyah* to clearly understand the mapping and the trajectory of his political Islam.

This research employs Jorge J. E. Gracia's hermeneutical approach, which often refers to as moderate hermeneutics, to analyze the views of Sayyid Qutb's thought of *al-Hākimiyyah*. Sahiron Syamsuddin, in his book entitled *Hermeneutika dan Pengembangan Ulumul Quran* claims that Gracia's "middle way" hermeneutics can integrate objective logic of the text and the subjective logic of the reader. He further names Gracia's hermeneutics as *objektivis-cum-subjektivis* school.¹¹ Gracia's hermeneutics is able to moderate two potentials of a text and reader to produce a kind of balance between the text's real meaning and the reader's horizon so that it develops a new meaning according to its context in the spirit of a respected period. The moderation shows an emphasis on the need for a balance between a search of the origin of a text and readers' role in the interpretation.

In general, Gracia's hermeneutic model can be described as the evolution of textual interpretation, as it creates a link between a text's historical context and its current audience, as well as its implications. Gracia argues that three factors collaborate in the series of interpretation:

¹⁰ Tim Forum Kajian Ilmiah Afkar, *Kritik Ideologi Radikal*, I. (Kediri: Lirboyo Press, 2019), 267.

¹¹ Sahiron Syamsuddin, *Hermeneutika dan Pengembangan Ulumul Qur'an* (Yogyakarta: Nawasea, 2009), 26-27.

First, the text to be interpreted (*interpretandum*), which includes the text's historicity. Second, an interpreter is someone who researches a text's historical meaning as well as creates a new meaning and its implications through the role of interpretation. Third, the insertion of meaning (*interpretans*), which eventually becomes a combination of *interpretandum* and interpretants, or what is known as interpretation.¹²

Islamism in Islamic History

Sociologists have theorized the relationship between religion and the state in the modern age into three major groups; the symbiotic paradigm, the secularistic paradigm, and the integralistic paradigm. The symbiotic paradigm explains that the relation of religion and state is perceived as symbiotic, i.e. a reciprocal relationship and mutual need. In this context, religion needs state as the state helps the religion to develop and flourish. On the other hand, state also needs religion because religion provides guidance of spiritual ethics and morals. State and religion cannot, therefore, be separated.¹³

The secularistic paradigm describes that there is a need to separate religion from state and separate state from religion. This paradigm rejects certain religious ideology to be a foundation of nation-state realm as it also denies the formation of state based on a particular religion. In other words, the state and the religion need to be separated as each entity has its own functions and territories. This paradigm insists that religion should be put solely in private domain, while state should operate within the public (the social) sphere. As a consequence, this paradigm rejects the implementation of the Islamic

¹² Jorge J. E. Gracia, *A Theory of Textuality: The Logic and Epistemology* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 149-150.

¹³ Marzuki Wahid and Rumadi, *Fiqh Madzhab Negara: Kritik atas Politik Hukum Islam di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001), 24-26.

values as a basis of nation-state realm and at the same time it also rejects the formation of an Islamic state.

The integralistic paradigm explains that religion and state can be integrated. It implies that state is both a political and a religious institution, and politics (state) rests within the realm of religion.¹⁴ Religion and politics, therefore, should be seen as two unified entities. The proponents of this paradigm are usually referred to as political-Islamic groups in which in their subsequent development called as the Islamism group. Their popular slogan is "Islam is a religion and a state."

Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897) seems to be the best example of the last paradigm as he responded by initiating the idea of Pan-Islamism or Islamic Nationalism as an effort to unify Islam in the form of a caliphate though many Islamic areas have been divided into nation-states. If we deeply examine, al-Afghānī's idea is an effort to realize a form of political Islam which refutes a form of monarchy. In the book *al-Radd 'alā al-Dahriyyīn* (Criticism of the Materialists), Afghānī denounces the Western model of imperialism while proposing the idea of uniting Muslims from various countries through Pan-Islamism. Muḥammad Rasyīd Riḍā responded positively to the idea of Afghānī. His response can be found especially in the work of *al-Khilāfah*. As a supporter of the Ottoman dynasty (after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (d. 1938) demolished the caliphate institution), Riḍā continued to preserve the idea of Salafism and the caliphate through his numerous articles published in the *al-Mannār Magazine*. His writings have been then compiled into a book entitled *al-Khilāfah*.

After Riḍā's death, Ḥasan al-Bannā and Sayyid Quṭb appeared and they became Islamist ideologues who continued his ideas. Ḥasan al-Bannā who known as an orator — as emphasized by his younger brother, Jamāl al-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

Bannā¹⁵— wrote many short treatises on how to be a true Muslim while asserting that Islam is a solution (*al-Islām huwa al-hall*). To him, Islam is able to answer all social, political, and economic problems. Ḥasan's main objective was *i'ādat al-khilāfah al-mafqūdah* (restoring the lost caliphate). To realize this ambition, he then formed al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn. Ḥasan ideology is in line with the views of Abū al-A'ālā al-Mawdūdī, Sayyid Quṭb, Taqīy al-Dīn al-Nabhānī, and other ideologues.

The ideology of these prominent Muslim figures significantly influenced the thoughts of Harakah Islamist groups such as Saudi Wahhabism, Hizb at-Tahrir, the Taliban, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Qaeda, and other extreme Muslim groups. The followers of Wahhabism for example, adopt the idea of a religious state and believe that the state should be governed by Islamic law. To enforce the implementation of the Islamic law they employ several mechanisms. To mention one of them is *al-'amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar*. Interestingly, the commission of *al-'amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar* has been established in the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Further influence of those Muslim figures can be observed within the ideology of Islamism of Hizb al-Tahrir. The works of Taqīy al-Dīn al-Nabhānī entitled *Nizām al-Ḥukm fī al-Islām* (System of Government in Islam) and *al-Shakhṣiyyah al-Islāmiyyah* (Islamic Personality) become an ample evidence of such influence. The same is also true with the ideology of al-Qaeda Islamism is it refers to the works of Osama bin Ladin entitled *al-'Amal al-Islāmī bayn Dawā'ī al-Ijtimā' wa Du'āt al-Nizā'* and *Majmū' al-Rasā'il wa Tawjīhāt*

¹⁵ Mukhammad Zamzami, "Islam sebagai Agama dan Umat: Analisa Pemikiran Kenegeraan Jamāl al-Bannā", *Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam* 1(1) (2011), 93–112.
<https://doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2011.1.1.93-112>.

Usāmah bin Lādin. All of these works have much in common with 'religionized politics' (Islamism) promulgated by Sayyid Quṭb in his *al-Ḥākimiyyah*, *Jāhiliyyah*, and the Islamic caliphate.

In Islam, "religionized politics" has been exercised for the sake of the imagined *ummah* (community) where its political structure is commonly referred to as a shariah-based state. Therefore, Islamism can be identified as an ideology that relates *al-dīn* (religion) with *al-dawlah* (state) in the aforementioned political system. This is a plan of religionized politics, not merely a spiritual one. Moreover, the agenda is not only exercised locally in main states with the past Islamic dominance but also globally where the Islamists insist on reforming the whole world.¹⁶

Islamism stands under three assumptions regarding the world political structure:

First, Islam for ordinary Muslims is not a system of governance but a system of worship and culture that determines their worldview and way of life. Here, based on their interpretation of Islam, it is evident that the formula of *al-dīn wa al-dawlah* (the unity of religion and state) is not coming from Islam, instead of a separating line between Islam and Islamism. They created the slogan to respond to the globalization caused by "the crisis of modern Islam" in all the Islamic civilizations.

Second, Islamized democracy in the proposed sharia-based system is a camouflage of a totalitarian structure agenda. The system is resisting the sovereignty of the people and democratic pluralism that acknowledges the political others. The Islamists think in a binary position about the real Muslims and the infidels and believe that Islamism is intrinsically not compatible with the "liberal" kind of Islam. They argue that Islamism does not affirm any ethical foundations of democratic pluralism.

¹⁶ Tibi, *Islam dan Islamisme*, 2-3.

Third, like religious fundamentalism, Islamism is not only the other form of modernity or what has been debated by scholars as "the two faces of modernity". It is a totalitarian ideology with the movements that represent it. Thus, the utilization of a democratic civil society as an analysis instrument does not change the totalitarian movement into a democratic movement.¹⁷

Besides, the idea of religionized politics is essential to understand the basic arguments of Islamism. Religionized politics is a campaign over a political structure believed to be coming from God's will and not from the sovereignty of the people. It is contradictory to Islam which does not recognize any particular political structure. Islam infers respective political values but does not form specific governance. We can say that Islamism was born out of a specific interpretation of Islam, but it is not strictly Islamic rather than a political ideology different from Islamic teaching.

Thus, Islamism is not a form of an Islamic revival. Islamism does not revive Islam but reconstructs Islam in a way that contradicts the Islamic legacy though Islam itself, in fact, always supports a moderate attitude as found in Q.S. al-Baqarah [2]: 143, Q.S. al-Isrā' [17]: 110 and 143, and Q.S. al-Qaṣaṣ [28]: 77 and at the same time it also admits differences in terms of a plurality of thoughts as a blessing and mercy from Allah.¹⁸ Islamism wants to return to the Islamic golden age through the way it has been made. The Islamists' utopia is the system imagined out of divine governance, namely *al-Ḥākimiyyah al-Ilāh*

¹⁷ Siti Mahmudah, "Islamisme: Kemunculan dan Perkembangannya di Indonesia", *Aqlam: Journal of Islam and Plurality* 3(1) (2018), 7. <http://dx.doi.org/10.30984/ajip.v3i1.628>.

¹⁸ As the Prophet said, "Difference among my Ummah is a mercy". This means that tolerance is *sunnatullāh*, while differences are mercy.

(God's governance), which never existed in Islamic history.¹⁹

The Islamists — both soft and extreme groups explained in the aforementioned introduction — are mainly inspired by the work of a prominent Muslim scholar of the al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, named Sayyid Qutb:

First, the Islamist movement has a political argument that Islam is a global and totalitarian system. According to their scholars, any Muslim community does not represent Islamic society, but there has to be an Islamic structure and foundation. They believe that every Muslim must rebel against any Muslim state that is not Islamic. They also see the Muslim obligation to criticize an "un-Islamic" leader as an infidel (*takfīr*) and legitimize violence in the form of terrorism or revolution against the regime.²⁰ The violent ideology starts from here.

Second, people can only be Islamized through socio-political agenda. Islamist movement intends to involve in political activities to gain power.²¹

Third, the Islamists accept a classical view that Islam is a complete and universal system that does not need a "modernization" or self-adjustment. Instead, they intend to apply this model to modern objects; modern society identifies as social, political, and economic objects.²²

Fourth, Islamism views that the implementation of sharia as the legal system is inevitable. However, Islam is

¹⁹ Tibi, *Islam dan Islamisme*, 1.

²⁰ Qutb, *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq*, 84, 106. Also see Hasan al-Bannā, "Risālah al-Jihād", in *al-Jihād fī Sabīlillāh* (Cairo: n.p., 1977). More extreme view on the obligation of *jihād* against non-Muslims even in a peaceful country or a country which is not at warfare state see, Muḥammad 'Abd al-Salām Faraj, *al-Jihād: al-Farīdah al-Ghāybah* (n.p.: n.pb., n.d.), 5.

²¹ Qutb, *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq*, 32-34. Faraj, *al-Jihād: al-Farīdah al-Ghāybah*, 3.

²² Qutb, *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq*, 49-51.

more than implementing sharia. It is a complete ideology. Thus, Islamization involves society, state, and laws altogether.²³

Their goal is to Islamize a political structure, to bring down the existing regimes, and do de-westernization. Islamic fundamentalists challenge and destroy secularism in the political institution and replace it with God's system or the so-called *al-Ḥākimiyyah al-Ilāh*. They intend not only a domestic structure but also a foundation toward a new world system as a substitute for the existing systems. Here, they build a dichotomous view to identifying the current ideologies, which is the system of Allah versus the secular system, *al-Nizām al-Islāmī* versus secular state, *shūra* versus democratic nation; sharia versus human-made laws or human legislation, and *al-Ḥākimiyyah al-Ilāh* versus people's sovereignty.²⁴

Islamism denies any modern ideologies such as secularism, individualism, tolerance, democracy and gender equality.²⁵ Islamism is an expression of a defensive culture that later becomes a mobilizing power to form international revolutionary activism. Islamism as a worldview is an effort to drive the ummah into the political group of collective "Muslims" against the rest of humankind.²⁶ This kind of political identity will generate a conflict at local, regional, and global levels. The utilization of religion as an identity marker by Islamism builds a perception that Islam is monolithic. This perception will bring trouble to the world. Their identity politics create a polarization instead of making a bridge.

²³ Rahmat, *Islamisme*, 26.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁵ Fred Halliday, "Review Article: The Politics of Islam: A Second Look", *British Journal of Political Science* 25, (3) (1995), 417. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400007262>.

²⁶ Tibi, *Islam dan Islamisme*, 53.

The Life of Sayyid Quṭb

His full name is Sayyid Quṭb Ibrāhīm Ḥusayn Shādzīlī. He was born in 1906 in Musya village, the district of Asyut, Egypt's highland (325 kilometres from Cairo). His family had a large land but not a rich family. His father, al-Ḥāj Quṭb bin Ibrāhīm, was a farmer and a commissioner of a national party.²⁷ Quṭb learned the Qur'ān in *kuttāb*.²⁸ When he was a child, there was a dispute between the traditional and modern groups. This dispute shows that Egypt mainly had two traditions in which both of them has their educational institution. The traditionalists had a *kuttāb* (a religious school), while the modernists had a modern education. The little Quṭb studied in the second institution.²⁹

When he was eleven years old, he had already memorized the Qur'ān and mastered the Arabic language. In his thirteen years of age, he went to Cairo to take an advanced teaching study in 1925. In the 1928-1933 period, he studied in Dar al-'Ulūm, which later became the University of Cairo and gained his graduate certificate.³⁰ In 1948-1950, Quṭb was sent to study the western education method in America. He entered two universities simultaneously, which are the University of Northern Colorado's Teachers College and Stanford University. He gained his Master Degree from those universities. Moreover, he also visited Swiss, England, and Italy. In those years, he was close to the government. However,

²⁷ Nuim Hidayat, *Sayyid Qutb: Biografi dan Kejernihan Pemikirannya* (Jakarta: Gema Insani, 2005), 16.

²⁸ David Sagiv, *Islam Otentisitas Liberalisme*, terj. Yudian W. Asmin (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1997), 39.

²⁹ Adib Hasani, "Kontradiksi dalam Konsep Politik Islam Eksklusif Sayyid Quṭb," *Epistémé: Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman* 11(1) (2016), 4. <https://doi.org/10.21274/epis.2016.11.1.1-30>.

³⁰ Robert D. Lee, *Mencari Islam Autentik: dari Nalar Puitis Iqbal Hingga Nalar Kritis Arkoun*, terj. Ahmad Baequni (Bandung: Mizan, 2000), 97.

after World War II, around 1945-1952, Egypt was in an unstable condition caused by the rulers' inability to agree about the decree 1936 between Egypt and England.

Living in Western countries, he found out about the decrease in morality. Alcohol and free sex were common practices. The experience made him disappointed with the Western civilization, which he had admired before.³¹ Spending two years in America, Quṭb had not hidden his disappointment toward the Western civilization as he wrote in his letters to his friends, 'Abbās Khadr. He said that America is undoubtedly a world manufacture that can do the best thing, but it will be disastrous if the whole world is like America.³² Quṭb also stated that he was aware that the western materialistic culture where communism was only an extreme logic that does not bring any human values could only lead humans to spiritual, social, and physical damages.³³

Then, he went back to Egypt and started writing about Islam. He believed that Islam is the only way to save humankind from materialism and worldly attachment.³⁴ Many Ikhwān leaders respected him as the author of the influential works. Some of the commissioned officers admitted that Quṭb's books were the most influential books before the revolution. His first book about Islam is *al-'Adālah al-Ijtīmā'īyah fī al-Islām* (Social Justice in Islam) published in 1949. Several concepts are generated from the book, such as social justice, redistribution, the limitation of wealth, minimum wages, and some western ideas of liberalism and communism.³⁵

³¹ Hidayat, *Sayyid Quṭb*, 42.

³² Sagiv, *Islam Otentisitas Liberalisme*, 40.

³³ Lee, *Mencari Islam Autentik*, 98.

³⁴ Dewan Redaksi Ensiklopedi Islam, *Ensiklopedi Islam* (Jakarta: Ihtiar Baru Van Hoeve, 1994), 145-146.

³⁵ Sayyid Quṭb, *al-'Adālah al-Ijtīmā'īyah fī al-Islām* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1995).

Quṭb said that European-American culture focuses on manufacturing, which will soon die before the end of the twentieth century. Before that happened, he stated, communism would dominate Western civilization, including America. In his view, communism takes a more ideological form than the principles undermining the West's French revolution because communism is a natural end of a culture without a soul, dream, and vision.

Quṭb believed that "the leadership of human beings will return to the hand of Islam. If Islam is not yet existing, they have to find it or create a similar regime with the same mistakes and contradiction." Quṭb argued that Marxist's social theory was initially seized Eastern and Western attention. Its limitation on "the state and the system" only will reduce the nature of the religious character in the movement.³⁶

Since then, Quṭb was known as an ideologue and the prominent theorist of Ikhwān community besides Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī and 'Abd al-Qādir 'Awdah. When the ban on the al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn was cancelled in 1951, he was on the executive committee. Around 1953, he attended conferences in Syria and Jordan and preached about the importance of morality as a requirement of the ummah revival. In July 1954, he led the daily publication of al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn that two months later was banned by Gamal Abdul Nasser's order, the president of Egypt, because it threatened the agreement between Egypt and England (7 July 1954).³⁷ Quṭb's dedication to the development and a radical Islamic missionary from the 1940s to his death in 1966 had made him in a contradicting situation with Western imperialism and the modernist regime Gamal Abdul Nasser who had ruled since 1952.

³⁶ Quṭb, *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq*, 5-8.

³⁷ Dewan Redaksi, *Ensiklopedi Islam*, 145-146.

Initially, Nasser supported Ikhwān and released its leaders from prisons. Nevertheless, his relationship with the Ikhwān was getting worse and resulted in a bitter dispute in late 1954. Then, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn was announced as the forbidden community, and the leaders, including Quṭb as the propagandist and the editor of the community journal, were jailed. Quṭb spent the rest of his life in jail, where he revised a Qur'ānic interpretation in thirty chapters and wrote another two books. Released in December 1964 and caught again in August 1965 to clarify his statements in *Milestones* (published several months after his release) that all the Arabic governments (including Nasser's regime) are not "Islamic." Quṭb was found guilty and sentenced to death in 1966.³⁸

Sayyid Quṭb's Background and Socio-political View

Sayyid Quṭb through his life is known as a fundamentalist Muslim³⁹ like Ḥasan al-Bannā, al-Mawdūdī, and Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, who condemned nationalism and its aspects of linguistic, ethnic, and liberal view. Islamic fundamentalism is a relatively modern movement yet grounding its doctrine in the early period of Muslim history. It has the vision to reform Islam, return to the purity of the religion, and create a truth and simple life exemplified by the prophet. This movement's ideology has a strong belief and has a fundamental character that is

³⁸ Sagiv, *Islam Otentisitas Liberalisme*, 98.

³⁹ One of the main doctrines in Quṭb's Islamic fundamentalism which was later adopted by al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn is "modern *jāhiliyyah*". Modernity means a new barbarism. This concept was initially uttered by al-Mawdūdī. The concept was largely developed in Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Nadwī's book in 1950, *Mādhā Khasira al-'Alām bi Inhiṭāq al-Muslimīn*. He explained the journey of Islam historically from its birth, golden period, and the fall. According to him, Muslims have suffered from moral and social decadence since the Ottoman period especially when the dynasty adopted the European kind of ideas and institution into its modernization. He further called the Western civilization as pagan and materialistic (*jāhiliyyah-mādiyyah*).

scripturalist in nature. Ḥasan al-Bannā, who shared a similar vision, wanted to bring back a comprehensive picture of Islam encompassing political, social, and economic life, "Islam is a belief and ritual, a state and nationality, religion and state, spiritual and ritual, al-Qur'ān and sword".⁴⁰

Quṭb stated that Muslim society is not merely a group of Muslims living together, but a group of Muslims who implement the sharia. According to him, the Muslim society is not those who create their Islamic version of life for themselves outside God's direction and His prophet Muḥammad PBUH. He further said that those forms of *jāhiliyyah* society could take many forms, such as a society that does not believe in God, gives a dialectical materialistic interpretation to history, and practices academic socialism (*al-Ishtirākiyyah al-'Ilmiyyah*). According to Quṭb, the *jāhiliyyah* society can also be a society that does not deny God's existence but separate the power of God in which they give the heavenly affair to God. Still, they take worldly affairs as their business. Thus, we can conclude that he measures an ideal Muslim society not by the quality of Muslims (the numbers of Muslims) but through the qualitative indicator of how Muslims implement the sharia.⁴¹

Quṭb's disappointment with Western civilization caused him to revolutionize his view about Islam. When he returned to Egypt and joined the government, he felt the same anxiety. His disappointment was more when the military party of the government refused his idea to change the state system. Since then, he was more

⁴⁰ Juandi, "Pemikiran Politik Sayyid Qutb: Melacak Geneologi Kekerasan", *Akademika: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 16(2) (2015), 154-155.

⁴¹ Badarussyamsi, "Pemikiran Politik Sayyid Qutb tentang Pemerintahan Islam," *Tajdid: Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin* 14(1) (2015), 154-155. <https://doi.org/10.30631/tjd.v14i1.4>.

committed to activism and criticized the government while provoking only two political options: Islam or *jāhiliyyah*.⁴²

The idea of the two political options had been there when he was in the west. As a believer who believed in Islam's teaching, he seemed to be so intimidated seeing the reality of how Islam was a joke in Western nations. His life experience in the west, such as moral decadence, insults to Arabs and Muslims, and the people's excitement over the death of Ḥasan al-Bannā, made him conclude that the western development carried a moral decadence.⁴³

Quṭb's thoughts are mainly around the idea of the Islamic movement and politics. However, he also wrote a Qur'ānic exegesis entitled *Tafsīr fī Zilāl al-Qur'ān*. As a premier source for the learners of the religion, his exegesis work and other books have influenced many Muslims, especially among the activists who share the idea of supporting the vision of Islam's supremacy (*al-khilāfah al-Islāmiyyah*).

One of Quṭb's theoretical concepts mostly cited and discussed is the concept of *al-Ḥākimiyyah*, which talks about the theory of governance in Islam. The idea is taken literally from the Qur'ān surah al-Mā'idah 44:

وَمَنْ لَّمْ يَحْكَمْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ فَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْكَافِرُونَ

Translation: "And those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are 'truly' the disbelievers."

Quṭb said that Islamic governance is based on the witness that there is no God but Allah.⁴⁴ The

⁴² Quṭb, *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq*, 45-46.

⁴³ Shahrough Akhavi, "The Dialectic in Contemporary Egyptian Social Thought: The Scripturalist and Modernist Discourses of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29(3) (1997), 377-401. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/164586>.

⁴⁴ Quṭb emphasized that verses 41-50 in surah al-'An'ām are fundamental for Muslims because they involve the basic of Islamic

representation of Allah in the concept of *al-Ḥākimiyyah* (sovereignty) in human life is through giving up their affairs to God's will and His decree through positioning the rights, the obligations, relations, attachments to the sharia, and the method taught by Him righteously. He inferred that when someone does not acknowledge God, does not submit to the will and the decree of God, and does not live in the sharia and the method taught by God, he or she is undoubtedly a disbeliever and not a monotheist. His view also emphasizes that believing in God and His messenger is the main foundation of Islam (*rukṅ al-Islām al-'awwal*) that has to be fulfilled to achieve the revival of Islam.⁴⁵

Critical Analysis of Sayyid Quṭb's Ideology of Islamism and *al-Ḥākimiyyah* through Jorge J. E. Gracia's Theory of Interpretation

Jorge J. E. Gracia in his book *A Theory of Textuality* introduces a theory of interpretation known as the interpretation function theory. In this theory, there are three stages that must be passed to obtain a comprehensive meaning, namely the historical function, meaning function, and implicative function. This theory of interpretation is of course not just born without Gracia's point of view in understanding and interpreting what the text is.⁴⁶

In explaining his theory of interpretation, Gracia first puts forward what is termed the interpreter's dilemma, namely the situation in which the interpreter feels

creed, the true Islamic method, and the legal system and ideal life in Islam. In this surah, Allah gives clear and detailed boundaries to which all Muslims must obey and refer to. See Sayyid Quṭb, *Fī Zilāl al-Qur'ān*, vol. 6 (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1972), 887; Sayyid Quṭb, *Khaṣāiṣ al-Taṣawwūr al-Islāmī wa Muqawwimātuh* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1988), 204.

⁴⁵ Quṭb, *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq*, 46-47.

⁴⁶ Gracia, *A Theory of Textuality*, 4.

concerned, whether the additional words given will make the audience understand more or not, or even the additional words will distort the text. In historical texts, interpreters are often trapped in personal assumptions that make the text's meaning blurry. An interpretation that essentially helps the audience understand the historical text as a whole has diverted from the original text due to unnecessary additions of information. From this case, fundamental questions about interpretation arise. Can an interpreter add to the information in his interpretation to help contemporary audiences understand the text according to his historical text? Can we understand the historical text and add information to it without actually changing it? These questions arise naturally when we discuss in detail what interpretation is. These questions — in Gracia's view — are what is called the "interpreter's dilemma".⁴⁷

Therefore, in assessing and providing critical value to the ideological concept of Quṭb's *al-Ḥākimiyyah*, the author tries to dissect it by using the theory of the interpretation function of Jorge J. E. Gracia, which argues that in interpreting the meaning of a text must pass three interpretation functions, namely historical function, meaning function, and implicative function.

a. Historical Function

An interpretation with its relation to history is useful to recall the writer's understanding or the understanding of the historical audiences to the readers' mind. To understand a text, one has to include an analysis of the two subjects: the writer and the people involved in the text's historicity, what is so-called historical audiences.

⁴⁷ Syamsul Wathani, "Hermeneutika Jorge JE Gracia Sebagai Alternatif Teori Penafsiran Tekstual Alqur'an," *al-A'raf: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam dan Filsafat* 14(2) (2017), DOI: 10.22515/ajpif.v14i2.945

Therefore, an understanding of a text cannot be without the text's historicity, as emphasized by Gracia.⁴⁸

To examine the genealogy and the basis of Quṭb's thoughts and ideas, the historical function analyses history in which his *al-Ḥākimiyyah* concept was written and observes the main references of his books. The genealogy of his thoughts began when his ideology was shifted from nationalism into radical Islam ideology. The significant shift was when Gamal Abdul Nasser gained power through the revolution in 1952. Nasser had widespread support from the people because he was seen as an anti-monarchy power in Egypt. Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn was initially supporting the revolution. Later, the relationship between Nasser and Ikhwān worsened due to the attempted murder by Ikhwān activists in 1954. Then, Nasser eradicated the movement and jailed its activists, including Quṭb.

Quṭb's radicalization process — to some observers — happened in the jail where he finished writing his two essential works: *Fī Zilāl al-Qur'ān* and *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq*.⁴⁹ *Ma'ālim* started with a statement: "*Taqīf al-bashariyyāt al-yawm 'alā ḥaffat al-hāwiyyah*". Quṭb said that the world today is on the edge of destruction. The threat comes from a serious thing that is the crisis of value (*iḥlās fī al-'ālam al-qiyām*). The crisis happened in the western world. Quṭb's criticism of the democratic Western world is interesting. He stated that the democratic west could not defend themselves against the eastern communism manifested in socialism. According to him, socialism in the west is a sign indicating the fall of western democracy.

⁴⁸ Gracia, *A Theory of Textuality*, 153.

⁴⁹ Hendrik Hansen and Peter Kainz, "Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Quṭb's Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8(1) (2007), 55-76.

Meanwhile, a similar crisis also happened on the eastern side (USSR and friends). The crisis of value in the east, he said, occurred when the promises of justice by communism were corrupted. Instead of creating justice, communism had given birth to a new social class, the party's apparatus, who became the new oppressors. In his sight, both capitalism in the west and socialism in the east were facing a dead end.

He proposed a solution: a new world order. In the introduction of a pamphlet, he commented, "*lā budda min qiyādah li al-bashariyyah al-jadīdah*" meaning: it is a must to present new world order. This slogan is not only a political order but also in values and morality. This kind of leadership, he said, can only be given by Islam because the leadership in the hands of the seculars has failed.⁵⁰

In his *Ma'ālim*, Quṭb said that Islam exists to return human beings to their God and place His mightiness as the only power that all the decisions and values of humanity be based on. He believed that besides the cause of human life, Allah's mightiness is the basis for the relation between humans and God. Human exists because of Him, and to Him, the human should return.⁵¹

According to Quṭb, Islam comes to preach that the only bond is the bond between humans and God; if the rope is broken, there are no other robes with Him and His mercy. To complete the Muslims' faith, Quṭb explained that all aspects of society should be based on God's rules, including politics and governance. However, the understanding of "the sovereignty of the government (*al-Ḥākimiyyah*)" in Islamic conception is not limited to the

⁵⁰ Ali Munhanif and M. Dahlan, "Lineages of Islamic Extremism in Egypt: Ikhwan al-Muslimun, State Violence and the Origins of Radical Politics", *Al-Jamiah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 56(2) (2018), 421-460. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2018.562.421-460>.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

implementation of the sharia and making judgments over various problems through the sharia perspectives. The meaning of sharia in Islam is not defined as legal-formal provisions and the government system but broadly encompasses everything ruled by Allah as it is manifested in the foundation of the faith, legal provisions, morality, and behaviour.⁵²

b. Meaning Function

Meaning function is to create in the audiences' mind an understanding that might goes beyond the understanding of the author and the historical audiences on a particular text.⁵³ As a contemporary audience, we try to view Quṭb's ideology and give an interpretation of the theory of *al-Ḥākimiyyah*. The concept is inspired from al-Mawdūdī and Quṭb developed the theory as found in his works. He took al-Mawdūdī's thoughts to create an idea that supports *takfīr* (labelling others as disbelievers).

As Quṭb developed the theory, he stopped in the ideology of *takfīrī*. Here, I write several arguments to see how he ended up being a supporter of the *takfīrī* ideology.

First, he made a wrong interpretation of the verse, "And those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are 'truly' the disbelievers" (Q.S. al-Māidah [5]: 44). He followed al-Mawdūdī's view on this verse when labelled others who do not implement God's laws as the unbelievers, although they might believe the verse. He also marks others who cannot implement the sharia as the disbelievers.⁵⁴

Quṭb has given a narrow interpretation of the verse. He easily called someone disbeliever without putting a larger context to the problem. Thus, he created *al-*

⁵² J. Calvert, "Sayyid Qutb and the Power of Political Myth: Insights from Sorel", *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 30(3) (2004), 509-528. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41299321>.

⁵³ Gracia, *A Theory of Textuality*, 153.

⁵⁴ Quṭb, *Fī Zilāl al-Qur'ān*, vol. 6, 888-889.

Ḥākimiyyah as the foundation of the faith. Quṭb wrote the requirements of the righteous faith, which are different from the rest of the ulama. He further called a Muslim society the disbelievers because they do not apply Islamic laws as a requirement of the faith. The ulama has a popular interpretation of the verse. Among the common interpretation explains that the meaning of the verse is those who refuse to believe that the verse is revealed from God; they will be unbelievers. In reverse, those who think that the verse is right from God but do not implement it are not called disbelievers.

As narrated by Imam Aḥmad, Ibn 'Abbās explained the cause of the revelation (*sabab al-nuzūl*) of the verse stating that this verse (al-Māidah verse 44) along with verses 45 and 47, is addressed mainly to the Jews when two Jewish groups clashed over criminal penalties in which the nobility attempted legal discrimination against the commoners. Then the Prophet Muhammad was asked to mediate them and this verse was finally revealed. Regarding the interpretation of the verse, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the author of *Tafsīr al-Kabīr*, states that what is meant by this verse was a threat to the Jews for their disobedience against God's rules contained already in the Torah. This has been also a reason why they are called infidels. Referring to this interpretation, it is known that the *khiṭāb* (target speech) of the verse is specific, namely the Jews.⁵⁵

This view has been supported by 'Abd Allāh bin 'Utbah, Ibn Maṣṣūr, Abū Shaykh, Ibn Mardawayh, and Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. In addition, Ibn Jarīr — narrated from Abū Ṣāliḥ — states that this verse does not apply to Muslims. Although there are some commentators who argue that the verse is can be generally applied to all people — referring to the rule of *al-'ibrah bi 'umūm al-*

⁵⁵ Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr aw Maḥāṭiḥ al-Ghayb*, vol. 12 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1981), 6-8.

lafẓ lā bi-khuṣūṣ al-sabab — they interpret *kufr* as not leaving religion but merely as *kufr* of favors (*kufr dūna kufr*). The conclusion is that the scholars are divided into two groups, namely those who in favor that the verse was strictly applied to the case of the Jews and those who prefer to see the verse as generally applicable for all people, including Muslims, but under a condition that the word *kufr* mentioned in the verse should be understood as *kufr dūna kufr*.⁵⁶

In this case, I argue that Quṭb has mixed his faith with the right of God. He made the Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) to determine the laws the Muslims should follow, and he made the laws as part of the belief. He believed that a Muslim could be a disbeliever when he does not submit to Islamic sharia. For some of the Muslim scholars, the faith and the sharia are different things. The faith is oriented to a clear meaning, while sharia is always open to reinterpretations.⁵⁷ Quṭb made a mistake as he added the fundamentals of the faith. He inserted the behaviour and the derivative things into the sphere of the faith. This view is similar to the Khawārij groups who argue that physical conducts are part of the greatest sin. Besides, Quṭb also argued that the Muslims' existence had been cut off that it is inevitable that the clash will happen among the groups of believers with the other groups.⁵⁸

Second, Quṭb often repeated a statement that made it the core value in his books, including in his *Fī Zilāl al-Qur'ān*. The statement is "*al-Ḥākimiyyah* is the most fundamental attribute of God". This statement is dangerous and has never been affirmed by any Muslim theologians. When grouped as a literary expression, this

⁵⁶ Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āy al-Qur'ān*, vol. 3 (Beirut: Muassasat al-Risālah, 1994), 101-103.

⁵⁷ Tibi, *Islam dan Islamisme*, 29.

⁵⁸ Usāmah Sayyid al-Azharī, *al-Ḥaqq al-Mubīn fī al-Radd 'alā Man Talā'aba bi al-Dīn* (Cairo: Dār al-Faḳīh, 2015), 52.

statement has a large meaning. However, he made the derivative (*furū'*) issues included in the attribute while they are supposed to be based on academic principles.

Third, Quṭb talked about the laws in the existing legal system. He viewed that the implementation of the laws indicates the affirmation to the laws made not by God. He insisted that the case above is the most arrogant attitude against God and a rebellion against one of His fundamental attributes, which is *al-Ḥākimiyyah*. Based on his understanding, he easily labels others as disbelievers. This is dangerous, especially when he denies the understanding of thousands of ulamas as the experts of religious knowledge and their consensus (*ijtihād*), knowing that they spent all of their lives studying the Islamic sharia.

Fourth, Quṭb has misunderstood the verse "There is no law except the laws of God." The Ulama in *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *tafsīr* commented on the verse while saying that it is God or Allah's right to give the verdicts such as allowed, forbidden, encouraged, not encouraged, legitimate, wrong, accepted and not accepted. In other words, there is nothing compared to Him. The prophets, the messengers and *ijmā'* are only the media to explain the laws of God. In every problem, Allah is the only entity that has the right to give a judgment.

Fifth, Quṭb did not understand a chapter in the knowledge *uṣūl al-fiqh* (the sources of Islamic laws), that is the chapter of *al-'awāriḍ al-'ahliyyah* that explains the people or persons who does not bear a consequence of Islamic sharia for several reasons.

Sixth, Quṭb gave a conclusion that the religious mission has been cut off. This opinion is weird and has never been affirmed by anybody. His idea offends Muslims because he negates knowledge, religion, civilization, virtue, and divine guidance. Quṭb moved from one mistake to another. Thus, he created a dangerous

issue. In his book *Ma'ālim*, he said that, "Indeed, the existence of the Muslims has been cut off since centuries ago".⁵⁹ He repeated his opinion in his other books and made it the core problem of Quṭb's *al-Ḥākimiyyah*.

In this context, Quṭb denied all the experiences and opinions toward the Qur'ānic verses from the existing ulama throughout history. He does not want to follow their methods. He further said that Muslims' thoughts are the *jāhiliyyah* legacies. He said, "There are many things we consider as the horizon of Islam, Islamic references, and the thoughts of Islam are the products of the *jāhiliyyah* society".⁶⁰

c. Implicative Function

The implicative function is to create in the audiences' mind an understanding of the implications of values, regardless of whether the implications are known or not by the author and the historical audiences. The significance of the theory brought by Quṭb is that it generates consequences for the contemporary *ḥarakī* movement. Quṭb did not realize that his concept of *al-Ḥākimiyyah*, which is different from the mainstream methodology and interpretation, has made it an ideological foundation for some radical groups to legitimize their actions.

Quṭb's *al-Ḥākimiyyah* ideology (divine sovereignty) has been always connected with such other ideologies as *jāhiliyyah* (ignorance) and *jihād*. Ignoring the sovereignty of God means being categorized as *jāhiliyyah* and *jāhiliyyah* must be demolished (*jihād*). On this point, *jihād* consists of two meanings, are an effort against the 'near enemy,' i.e. the 'apostate' regime in the territorial space which is traditionally known as the 'land of Islam' (*dār al-*

⁵⁹ Quṭb, *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq*, 8.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 17-18, 45.

Islām) and against 'distant enemies,' namely non-Islamic regimes in the 'land of disbelief' (*dār al-kufr*).⁶¹

Quṭb's supporters see his death at the hands of his persecutors as a redemptive access to self-sacrifice in defense of a lofty cause; a worthy emulation by those who admire him. 'Abd al-Salām Faraj, the Egyptian figure who wrote the radical militant treatise *al-Farīdah al-Ghāibah* (Forgotten Obligations), was one of Quṭb's devotees. The obligation referred to in Faraj's book is combative *jihād*. The essence of this treatise is to call upon Muslims to relaunch military *jihād* as in his view the Muslims are besieged by external and internal enemies, namely non-Muslims and "apostate" Muslims (who reject God's sovereignty). Faraj mocked many Muslim scholars of his time. To him these Muslim scholars encouraged their fellow Muslims to abandon this important obligation, i.e. *jihād*.⁶²

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) group also adopted many of Sayyid Quṭb's thoughts through DABIQ magazine. As mentioned by Muhammad Rashidi Wahab et al. in their study, it is stated that in the 15 series of DABIQ Magazine, approximately five times or 33.3% *al-Hākimiyyah* discoursed in the magazine. Wahab et al.'s

⁶¹ Hasnan Bachtiar, Luciana Anggraeni, and Muhammad Asep, "Rethinking the Contemporary Discourse of Jihād," *Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam* 9(2) (2019), 306–325. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2019.9.1.306-325>; Huda, Sokhi, "Terorisme Kontemporer Dunia Islam," *Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam* 4(2) (2014), 441. <https://doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2014.4.2.429-450>.

⁶² Faraj said, "*Jihād* [war] for the sake of Allah, though very important and meaningful for the future of the Islamic religion, it has been ignored by many Muslim scholars. They pretend to forget this obligation though they know that this is the only way to restore and strengthen the glory of Islam." See Faraj, *al-Jihād: al-Farīdah al-Ghāibah*, 5. Also see Asma Afsaruddin, *Striving the Path of God: Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought*, trans. Muhammad Irsyad Rafsadie (Bandung: Mizan, 2018), 299.

article concludes that based on the contents of the DABIQ magazine above, ISIS has punished infidels to anyone among Muslims who are proven to have violated the concept of Wahhabi *Tawḥīd* Trilogy (*Ulūhiyyah*, *Rubūbiyyah*, and *al-Asmā' wa al-Ṣifāt*), *al-Walā' wa al-Barā'*, and *al-Ḥākimiyyah* ideology. As a result, all Muslims are considered infidels by ISIS because they do not share their views.

Therefore, every lawful disbeliever has his blood shed by the mujahideen or combatants. Fighting infidels and apostates is obligatory for every Muslim who is obliged to emigrate and fight with ISIS. At the same time, the purpose of this *jihād* is to establish an Islamic State led by a Caliph. With the establishment of an Islamic State, the religion of Islam can be enforced in accordance with the Ḥadīth of the end of time. This framework of thought forms the basis of their belief and proves that the basic framework of the *al-Ḥākimiyyah* ideology is the basis behind all ISIS actions.⁶³

The belief in Allah's oneness in the *al-Ḥākimiyyah* conception resulted in the denial of the laws, values, systems, and regulations made by human beings. The doctrine teaches that Allah's belief does not have a value unless Muslims submit themselves to the rules of God in their behaviours and their way of life (*al-Manḥaj al-Ilāhī*). Consequently, Quṭb's *al-Ḥākimiyyah* creates an understanding of what is called *takfīr al-ḥukkām*, which is a belief that all the governments that do not apply the principle of *al-Ḥākimiyyah* are becoming infidels and must be brought down and replaced by the government that implements the laws of God. The coup attempts for this reason, Quṭb believed, is the primary goal of *jihād*:

⁶³ Muhammad Rashidi Wahab et al., "Majalah DABIQ sebagai Medium Propaganda Pemikiran Tauhid Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS)," *Afkar: Journal of Aqidah & Islamic Thought* 23(2) (2021), 364-365. <https://doi.org/10.22452/afkar.vol23no2.10>.

"The primary goal of *jihād* is to destroy the structures of systems contradictory to the principle of Islam and build a government institution based on Islam replacing all the systems outside Islam. This urgent issue, which is creating a global Islamic revolution, is not limited to some areas since Islam obviously wants it to happen worldwide. This is the main goal of Jihād and the great vision of Jihād we all miss."⁶⁴

With the concept of *al-Hākimiyyah*, Quṭb succeeds to formulate his derivative thoughts such as *Jāhiliyyah al-Qarn al-'Ishrīn* (The *Jāhiliyyah* or backwardness of the 20th century) and *ḥatmiyyah al-ṣadām* (the inevitability of clash). He made the concepts to support his main radical argument that *jihād* is obligatory for everyone (*farḍ 'ayn*) and that every Muslim should work on establishing the *khilāfah*.⁶⁵ To describe the influence of Quṭb for the radical Islam, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍawī in his book *Muzakkirāt* said, "Indeed, the disease of *takfīr* the contemporary Muslims suffer from cannot be separated from the influence of the books *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭāriq*, *Fī Zīlāl al-Qur'ān*, and *al-'Adālah al-Ijtimā'iyyah*".⁶⁶ Quṭb wrote these books. However, Qaraḍawī's statement might seem exaggerated because a similar ideology has also infected Wahhabism despite the level of their radicality with the Jihadists.

Quṭb — who was well-known to as the man who caused the mushrooming of *takfīrī* ideology—shares a similar worldview to the Khawārij group in movement, while in the sphere of faith (*i'tiqādī*) he is different from the past group called Khawārij. 'Usāmah Sayyid Maḥmūd commented that Quṭb's understanding is different from

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 55, 142.

⁶⁵ al-Azhārī, *al-Ḥaqq al-Mubīn*, 17.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 138.

the ulamas' perspectives throughout history, from the prophet's companions period, *tābi 'īn*, *tābi' al-tābi 'īn*, the early ulama, to the contemporary Muslim scholars such as Mutawallī al-Sha' rāwī.

The following table illustrates the implications of the meaning and ideology of *al-Hākimiyyah* — which are among them referred to in Q.S. al-Māidah: 44 — towards the emergence of radical Islamic groups around the world.

Table 1.1 The Effects and Implications of *al-Hākimiyyah*'s Ideology

Sayyid Qutb and the Ideology of <i>al-Hākimiyyah</i>	Effects and Implications
<p><i>al-Hākimiyyah</i>; an ideology about the sovereignty of God and the source or origin of the ideology of radical Islamism.</p>	<p><i>Takfīr al-Hukkām wa Ajhizat al-Dawlah</i> (disbeliev in the government and state apparatus). The ideology of <i>al-Hākimiyyah</i> will have implications for infidel verdicts on the government and apparatus that do not apply the basics of God's sovereignty.</p>
	<p><i>Jāhiliyyah al-'Ālam</i>. People who do not follow the sovereignty of God (<i>Hākimiyyat Allāh</i>) are called the <i>Jāhiliyyah</i> society as found in the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad.</p>
	<p><i>Al-Walā' wa al-Barā'</i>. A view which emphasizes that obedient group to God's sovereignty (<i>Hākimiyyat Allāh</i>) must be protected and loved, while disobedient and rebellious groups must be hostiled and fought.</p>
	<p><i>Dār al-Harb</i> or <i>Dār al-Kufr</i>. This view believes that all areas that do not recognize God's sovereignty are battlefields or areas of <i>kufr</i>.</p>
	<p><i>Al-Jihād fī Sablillāh</i>. <i>Jihād</i> is the struggle to overthrow and fight the government and its state apparatus</p>

	and the killing of polytheists of different religions.
	<i>Iqāmat al-khilāfah 'alā minhāj al-nubuwwah</i> . The prime goal and agenda is to realize the caliphate according to the prophetic method (Prophet Muhammad).

After the death sentence, his influence largely spread that he later was called a martyr or *al-Shahīd*. His effect on al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn has been nearly messianic. The followers of his ideology have given a new spirit to the jihadists.

Some figures influenced by him are 'Abd Allāh 'Azzām and 'Umār 'Abd al-Raḥmān. 'Umār, who was a blind man, established the Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah in 1973 because the Ikhwān activists were banned in universities. This organization inspired the establishment of Jamā'ah Islamiyyah (JI) di Indonesia. The followers of Qutb were mostly farmers and ordinary people who did not study the religion deeper. The followers range from lawyers, scientists, and professors in prominent universities.

Moreover, radical Muslims were getting more radical because of Qutb's ideology.⁶⁷ 'Abd Allāh 'Azzām is a member of Ikhwān from Palestina. He is a doctor in Islamic jurisprudence, al-Azhar University and the legitimate ideological successor of Qutb. 'Azzām is an initiator of global jihād among the jihadists who only focused on particular "evil" states. 'Azzām is the man who united the jihadists under a significant power to fight against what he called the deviation happening in the world. He also produced a *fatwā* (religious command) on the Muslim's obligation to conduct a global Jihad (*difā'an 'an arḍ al-Muslimīn*).

⁶⁷ Afkar, *Kritik Ideologi Radikal*, 13.

Conclusion

Quṭb's Islamism, especially the theory of *al-Ḥākimiyyah lillāh* has radically denied all the laws, systems, values, and regulations made by humans. Such ideology is based on al-Qur'ān dan Ḥadīth in which their interpretations are locked that other people cannot go against it. Other people who criticize it will be considered against the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth and make them the enemy of Islam.

Islamism, through the framework of *al-Ḥākimiyyah*, is a political structure, not a faith structure. Nevertheless, this kind of Islamism is not merely political, but what Bassam Tibi called religionized politics. Quṭb's ideological proposal is a real example of the religious doctrine of global fundamentalism. In Islamism, religionized politics means promoting a political structure believed to be from Allah's will, not from people's sovereignty. Tibi argued that Islam indeed carries political values but does not command a particular form of governance. Quṭb's ideas are the specific interpretation of Islam but not necessary Islam: it is a political ideology different from Islam's teaching.

Employing Jorge J. E. Gracia's theory of interpretation functions, we tried to dissect Quṭb's line of thought and his revolutionary thought on the ideology of Islamism and his *al-Ḥākimiyyah* ideology. Through the 'historical function', it is found that Quṭb put his ideology of *al-Ḥākimiyyah* on literal interpretation of surah al-Māidah verse 44. Quṭb interpreted the verse using no methodology underlined by other scholars of his time. As a result, he seems to have locked the truth within his own interpretation he wrote and contrasted it with other Muslim scholars. On this point, Quṭb mixed the matter of *furū'īyyah* with the realm of *'aqīdah*. As a consequent of this view, law enforcement of a country is an avoidable obligation. Quṭb emphasized the establishment of an Islamic government based on the principle view that 'there

is no god but Allah'. Quṭb describes God's sovereignty in human life by submitting their affairs and destiny only to His will. To him, Muslims must devoutly obey God and they must firmly tie their rights, obligations, and relationships to the sharia and God's methods as well as to the laws of pious government. Once people do not recognize the sovereignty of God, they are not in the will of Allah and they go stray from the sharia. Therefore, they are considered *mushrik* and *kāfir*.

Through the 'meaning function', the ideology of *al-Ḥākimiyyah* has confused belief with God's authority. Quṭb distanced himself from the methodology used by other scholars in understanding the Qur'ān. He tried to understand *al-Ḥākimiyyah* with his own assumptions, feelings and paradigms. In fact, he saw the interpretation of other Muslims scholars as a product of ignorance. According to him, the basis of understanding the Qur'ān used by these scholars is too aesthetic, which has no firm parameters and its nature is too universal. He felt it since his childhood. He found also unclear and no detailed scientific methodology employed by other scholars of his lifetime in their interpretation of the Qur'ān. To him, detailed and clear scientific methodology is a must as it became an ultimate guideline of previous Muslim scholars throughout the history of Islam in exploring the meaning of the Qur'ānic verses.

Over and done with the 'implicative function', Quṭb has concluded that this religious treatise has experienced a sort of disconnection as he stated in his *Ma'ālīm fī al-Ṭarīq* explaining that the existence of Muslims had been cut off several centuries ago. Quṭb kept repeating the same statement in his other works in which it becomes the crux of the problem lies in understanding *al-Ḥākimiyyah*. To us, the theory of *al-Ḥākimiyyah* has led to several dangerous thoughts in which radical Islamist groups and movements widely apply to realize their goals in

implementing the ideology of Islamism. *Al-Ḥākimiyyah* has been an epicenter of the ideology embraced by the Islamist groups around the world. It also greatly inspired several views such as *Dār al-Ḥarb* or *Dār al-Kufr, Jāhilīyyah al-‘Ālam, al-Walā’ wa al-Barā’*, and how Muslim people who hold this ideology disobey the government and state apparatus. Therefore, this dangerous ideology should be straightened out in order to prevent greater and serious disadvantage.

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