

Conceptualizing Global Leadership Education (GLE): Lessons learned from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia

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Abstract

This article examines the term Global Leadership Education (GLE) and expands the concept from the perspective of economics and education as a dual disciplinary approach. In recent years, China has been aggressively promoting its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through regional cooperation and soft power as its political strategy. Southeast Asia (particularly for ASEAN) is the most vibrant area of growth and expansion of BRI, and this content analysis examines sources from fifty top and recent primary documents, articles, reports, and policies to draw out elements of global leadership practices so that lessons can be learned and integrated into the GLE for the region. The integration of China's long-term strategy and investment in ASEAN has highlighted important ideas and themes that can be considered transferable to the development of GLE, and this implies that more can be developed in aspects of modular training, strategic knowledge, and leadership skills transfer for the stability and sustainability of socio-economic prosperity in the region.

Keywords: Global leadership education, Soft-power, Belt and Road Initiative, Circular Economy

Introduction

Global Leadership education (GLE) is the development of a global perspective on issues that affect our society (Pan & Chen, 2021; Walker, 2018). To most scholars in economics and business, GLE is concerned with the awareness, proactivity, and ability to address global issues (Caligiuri & Tarique, 2012). Before the term "global leadership" was added to the lexicon of international relations, people in search of new knowledge about diplomacy and foreign policy looked to leadership studies (Black et al., 1991). However, this disciplinary focus has narrowed over time, and now a central debate is whether certain aspects of that field are necessary (Adler, 1983). For people who have asked serious questions about the state of China's politics and what it means for their future abroad if they lack adequate leaders on both an individual and collective level, then one would know there is no greater need than for global leadership education (Hruby et al., 2022).

Global leaders have been a valuable and integral part of modern-day society for decades. In many ways, they are almost indistinguishable from those who come from similar socio-economic backgrounds (Pan & Chen, 2021). Yet recent studies have shown that there is still a major disconnect between education leadership studies with the experience learned from economic systems toward regional cooperation (Turner et al., 2019). Much can be learned from multidisciplinary studies, and this article attempts to draw the lessons from the BRI initiative in Southeast Asia so that an ideology of global education leadership can be conceptualized for educationists to understand and transfer the necessary knowledge gained from other fields of political and economic developments (Black et al., 1991).

Globalization and internationalization have had a dramatic impact on life in many countries around the world, including China. The process has been occurring for decades, but the last twenty years have witnessed a significant acceleration in these phenomena. Globalization can be defined as the movement of people, information, and goods across national borders (Bennett, 1977). It occurs when an individual, a business, or an institution becomes part of global networks in which they can interact and participate with others in other nations. Internationalization also refers to this process but is limited to businesses or organizations that operate internationally and have offices or other activities outside their home country. These terms are often used interchangeably, although some experts feel they are different. In addition, many countries have also sought to develop 'soft power' programs by putting individuals on the ground in foreign countries or by establishing cultural centers (Caligiuri & Tarique, 2012). By definition, soft power is intangible power - the ability to achieve objectives through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion (Antonova et al., 2020). Using it requires a comprehensive and integrated strategy drawn from a country's economic, cultural, diplomatic, legal, and military strengths (Adler, 1983). It means using these strengths in tandem with effective multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and international law to create an environment in which solutions can be found. But such efforts are best seen as part of a larger whole that includes not only foreign policy but also diplomacy, trade policy, and military strategy. It is a mistake to think of soft power as separate from these other elements. Nor should it be used as a substitute for hard power, either (Antonova et al., 2020). In today's world, using soft power is often a more effective way of achieving policy objectives than the use of hard power (Antonova et al., 2020). Indeed, even the most powerful country in the world finds it difficult to achieve its objectives by using soft power alone. But when used together with hard power, it can be extraordinarily successful (Arthur & Bennett, 1995). That's why policymakers need to put both soft and hard power to work for their countries' GLEs to succeed. As such, policymakers should not over-emphasize soft power, but treat it as one of many tools at their disposal. They should see it as a crucial part of the GLE which can be deployed in various ways to create an environment in which solutions can be found. By doing so, officials will find that soft power creates a more peaceful and prosperous world for their countries, one that is more likely to embrace rather than reject them (Antonova et al., 2020). On the other hand, in the wake of Brexit and with the rise of nationalism and populism in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere, there has been a great deal of talk about soft power (Bennett, 1977). Yet while many policymakers have praised soft power to achieve global leadership education (GLE), few have given any concrete ideas on how to use it (Pan & Chen, 2021). While there are no simple answers or silver bullets to solving global problems such as poverty, inequality, climate change, migration, terrorism, and so forth - especially not in today's globalized world (Walker, 2018). In addition, each country has a different set of strengths that can be put to

work. China is a case in point. It has used its economic strength to impose tariffs on imported goods to protect home-grown industries and to expand its influence in other countries. It also uses its cultural strength by ensuring that the Chinese language is well represented around the world and that Chinese films are shown at leading film festivals (Adler, 1983). By doing so, it ensures that it will be viewed favorably in ASEAN countries as well as other regions around the world.

Background of Study

History proves that each element of a country's GLE is critical and must be well integrated for it to succeed. Just as importantly, each part of a GLE strategy can be used to achieve a wide range of objectives (Walker, 2018). When one considers the economic, cultural, and diplomatic strengths that countries have at their disposal, it is clear why soft power should be put to work in tandem with hard power to achieve specific policy objectives. For example, India is seeking to use its economic and cultural strengths in tandem with diplomacy as it pursues its GLE (Adler, 1983). According to a study done by the World Bank, there is a strong correlation between the educational attainment of the head of state in a country and that country's rate of economic growth (Abreu & Ceglia, 2018). The study found that GDP per capita was higher for countries whose heads of state had attained either secondary or tertiary education – thus implying that increased access to global leadership education leads to an increase in economic prosperity (Caligiuri & Tarique, 2012). Another way global leadership education can have an impact on personal lives is through improved health care quality (Hruby et al., 2022).

From the perspectives of educationists, Global Leadership education works to promote a sense of global citizenship and social awareness among students. few universities have started to implement this into their curriculum. In the USA, some schools have included a section on Global Awareness in their civics and government course – referred to as GLDP (Hruby et al., 2022; L. Liu et al., 2020). Some school districts offer GLDP in their curriculum as an elective. Some schools, like the University of West Florida and the NYU Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development programs have incorporated GLE into their higher education curriculum (Turner et al., 2019). In terms of learning, a great way for students to become more global citizens is through community service. After participating in a GLDP activity, students may have a greater understanding of the world around them and be more likely to help those in need (Hruby et al., 2022). Some students may want to pursue a career in international relations. Students that are going into the field of international relations can learn more about global cultures and issues (Caligiuri & Tarique, 2012). Students may also want to work in business (Hruby et al., 2022). Having a global understanding of business can be advantageous for students that want to become an entrepreneur or investors. Another topic of interest related to global leadership education is the focus on sustainability, or lack thereof, in schools. This includes not only the form of energy used by schools (e.g. fossil fuels vs. alternative sources) but also the impact on the local ecosystem by way of school activities (e.g. air and water pollution) (Hruby et al., 2022).

Leading China's Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) in Southeast Asia

China has been steadily investing in infrastructure for the last four decades, a process that accelerated after the 2008 global financial crisis. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China's

ambitious plan to link more than 60 countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa with trade and investment (Gong, 2019). The first phase of the BRI was officially launched in 2013 with projects worth USD 40 billion across 20 countries. Across these developments, \$3 billion came from Beijing while the remaining amount was financed by state-owned enterprises or joint ventures China set up with local partners (Rogozhina, 2021). Southeast Asia has been a hotspot for Chinese investment in recent years. China's BRI initiatives open new economic opportunities for both Chinese and other firms in these nations with the hope that more investments will be made in agriculture, manufacturing, banking, and finance, as well as communications and IT services industries.

Many obstacles must be overcome such as high-interest rates or lack of capital or uncertainty about a country's future potential. China hopes to attract Chinese technology companies to set up operations in Southeast Asia at lower costs than those at home. China's state-owned and private companies alike have bought stakes in everything from oil and rubber to telecoms. The region is already home to more than 1 million Chinese nationals, with those numbers expected to grow as China's infrastructure plans proceed (Heiduk & Sakaki, 2019).

China's most ambitious undertaking, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), will also have an enormous impact on the region. In 2014, China announced an ambitious plan to finance major infrastructure projects abroad through a new Silk Road Fund that had \$40 billion of capital at its disposal by June 2017 (Gong, 2019). The purpose of the fund is to ease China's funding constraints in other areas, especially domestic infrastructure development (H. Liu et al., 2021).

The Silk Road Fund, the Silk Road Fund Institute, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have also ushered in a new wave of Chinese investment and influence in Asia's least developed countries (LDCs), which had already seen a surge in Chinese interest. From economic data, China has planned to invest \$20 billion more in six Southeast Asian countries in 2018, cited from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In total, China will invest \$166 billion spread out over 24 infrastructure projects in the region and highlighted by ADB (H. Liu et al., 2021). Chinese leadership believes that governments should be responsible for building infrastructure, not private companies because they have an advantage over private firms who need to generate a profit but lack experience and reliable financing (Fiedler, 1971). Moreover, this is an area where other countries should come forward and invest when their economies are strong enough to do so. This will help promote development and build a more integrated global economy.

Leadership in China's BRI is not only an economic strategy, but an important tool that can be used to address other major issues concerning its foreign policy such as the disputes in the region, and ethnic conflicts (H. Liu et al., 2021). Widely known, China's Belt and Road Initiative is a foreign policy that aims to increase investment and trade in countries along the Silk Road. This initiative is being led by President Xi Jinping, with this goal in mind for China's prosperity (Rogozhina, 2021). And with many countries benefiting from these investments, there are many reasons why so many economists believe that the Chinese economy will prosper as well (Heiduk & Sakaki, 2019). But their approach to Global leadership education remains a novel area to be studied. Be it the success or failure of BRI, as well as the economic and political lessons learned from their leadership experience, is fundamental knowledge that can help support the need for GLE in this region of Southeast Asia (Arthur & Bennett, 1995). As a scope of this multidisciplinary study, the author will be elaborating on the conceptualization of a

curriculum for GLE, using the lessons learned from the One-belt-one road initiative in Southeast Asia.

Problem Statement

Global leadership education is not without its critics, however (Park et al., 2018). In some cases, there are no international guidelines or regulations on local curriculum development and implementation – leading to very different results in terms of quality and effectiveness of global leadership education across the globe (Bennett, 1977). Another critique of global leadership education is that there are too many conflicting viewpoints on what it should consist of, or even whether there should be a central body that oversees global leadership education (Tolstikov-Mast et al., 2019).

A further criticism is that the benefits of global leadership education are unproven. According to this view, the focus is placed too much on “feel good” factors, such as increasing students’ confidence and self-esteem; while these factors are not necessarily bad, they do not necessarily lead to learning either (Park et al., 2018). The argument that global leadership education is beneficial simply because it makes students feel good, or because it provides them with the opportunity to oversee their lives, does not make sense (L. Liu et al., 2020). There are too many flaws with this argument for it to be valid. For example, as much as global leadership education can provide these feelings, this does not mean that the program is therefore beneficial (Turner et al., 2019).

Another criticism of global leadership education is that there are too few opportunities for the student to put their ideas into action (Innes-Taylor et al., 2019). Although this is a relatively minor point and could easily be addressed by increasing class participation, reducing class size, or teaching skills other than communication (e.g. the importance of deadlines and time management), it is still an important point (L. Liu et al., 2020).

A final criticism of global leadership education concerns the priorities that are placed on the curriculum (Walker, 2018). Although there is no perfect way to design a curriculum, it would seem in some cases that there is more focus on personal development and self-esteem than actual academic achievement (Pan & Chen, 2021). In this view, global leadership education falls short of its goal, since most graduates will have difficulty finding work in the very competitive job market (Innes-Taylor et al., 2019). Many graduates see the course content as being a waste of time since they feel few if any useful skills were taught (Tolstikov-Mast et al., 2019). In response to these criticisms, it should be noted that global leadership education ought to be based on a sound platform. But the question is what is, and where to start? The basic premise of global leadership education – those students learn more when they are actively involved in their education – has been proven time and time again (Antonova et al., 2020). As such, global leadership education is far from a program with no benefits or effectiveness; instead, it is a program that provides its participants with many benefits that are difficult to dispute. Even the most strident critics of global leadership education agree with this point, even if they disagree about whether those benefits outweigh any potential negatives (Pan & Chen, 2021).

Another area of disagreement among experts is the role of global leadership education in the education system. Many experts strongly support the inclusion of global leadership education and its principles, as well as its components, into wider programs (Innes-Taylor et al., 2019).

In no way does this detract from local schools' abilities to incorporate these ideas; instead, it guides future curriculum development and implementation, as well as for future programs such as professional accreditation schemes (Park et al., 2018). It is important to highlight that though many experts agree that global leadership education has a positive impact on the lives of its participants, there is no agreement as to how much that impact is (Hruby et al., 2022). People interested in studying global leadership education must become more self-aware of their strengths and weaknesses so that they can move forward on achieving regional and strategic goals that will impact socioeconomic, cultural, and political goals (Tolstikov-Mast et al., 2019).

Purpose of Study

There are various reasons to learn global leadership education. In practice, the majority of universities use a systems theory of education that emphasizes learning and improving the world by using innovative methods. Universities provide platforms for students to engage in different cultures through various events including cultural festivals, class trips, etc (Caligiuri & Tarique, 2012). This helps students to cultivate their sense of global citizenship and leadership skills. In terms of importance, global leadership education is crucial and helps people to fulfill their potential as future leaders in their respective fields. Emerging countries have already started utilizing this competency to strengthen their presence globally since they have more freedom from previous historical wounds and are more focused on the future of their global leadership development programs (Hruby et al., 2022).

As highlighted in the problem statement, some economic and socio-political experts disagree as to whether global leadership education provides significant economic or social benefits to countries and societies (Tolstikov-Mast et al., 2019). On the other hand, some scholars have also found to agree that the benefits are greatly outweighed by the risks of not providing such programs, there does not appear to be a consensus among researchers about which factors should be taken into consideration when evaluating the overall effectiveness of global leadership education programs – both in the short term and in the long term (Park et al., 2018).

The central theme of this study consists of two key questions:

1. *What can be learned from China's approach to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia?*
2. *What vital components should be integrated into Global leadership Education with the BRI in Southeast Asia?*

These are the questions that remain unanswered by many critics and supporters of global leadership education alike (Pan & Chen, 2021). Therefore, establishing a clear understanding of global leadership education is a prerequisite for its effective functioning.

Research Method

Content analysis

Content Analysis refers to the process of examining the content of a text, idea, or event to extract themes, patterns, and intentional messages (Downe & Wamboldt, 1992). Content analysis is a method of qualitative research in which the researcher analyzes the meaning of a text. The text can be any type of documents, such as a literature review, interview transcript, existing policy document, or another type of report (Lacy et al., 2015). To conduct content

analysis, the researcher needs to develop some theories about what he found out and then use different tools, such as Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis) and methods (such as coding, describing keywords, and thematic analysis (Downe & Wamboldt, 1992). In terms of applications, content analysis is what businesses, agencies, and individuals do to make sense of the content that comes before them.

As this study concerns GLE from the exploration of the BRI initiative in Southeast Asia, the researcher will involve a process of examining how and why leadership in BRI works, and its approaches, as well as looking at its broader implications (Heiduk & Sakaki, 2019). It also refers to the practice of analyzing audiences' reactions to texts. In other words, content analysis is a form of literary criticism that can examine anything from economic reports to political strategies and the portal of news. From the researchers' understanding of content analysis, the approach will utilize the simple approach of collecting the relevant articles, news, and published reports from economic and education databases, and code the primary documents into themes to address each of the research questions. Before the start of content analysis, the researcher has amassed and streamlined 50 top primary documents that are directly related to GLE and BRI from a total of 120 printed materials such as economic reports, state-owned news portals, and articles. Thereafter, these primary documents were organized and coded for content and key ideas related to the research questions.

Coding and thematic building

For the researcher, qualitative coding deeply contextualizes the work from both quantitative and qualitative sources, potentially illuminating new issues or gaps in current understanding. It helps the researcher to focus on the investigation. Qualitative coding, an inherently interpretive approach, often requires more time and resources than ethnography; however, it also has the potential to often yield deeper results (Alasuutari, 2010). Qualitative coding cannot be quantified or reduced to numbers, but rather reveals patterns that cannot be easily researched using quantitative methods such as surveys (Alam, 2021).

Findings

1. What can be learned from China's approach to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia?

- a) China is strengthening alliances with regional trade partners and countries

The BRI is seen to boost Chinese enterprises' competence and reach in the global economy, particularly in Southeast Asian nations since 2020 (Gong, 2019). With expanding technical and economic breakthroughs, Figure 1 has shown that China has invested in many strategic countries in the world.




Figure 1: Distribution of BRI investments in 2020

Alternatively, Figure 2 shows its investment in ASEAN countries and a variety of foreign sectors. BRI's strategic plans emphasize economic growth. The US impact drove China to open its markets to new partners and commodities, expanding its political and economic ties (Rogozhina, 2021). China is enhancing its position as a primary developer and trading partner in Asia to claim its title as the continent's main economy. It also wants to increase global economic connections with its western counterparts by demonstrating BRI's potential (H. Liu et al., 2021).




Figure 2: Chinese Investments in the ASEAN region

b) Increasing number of investments is a commitment of China's future interest

In terms of comparisons, despite a sharp drop in total BRI investments in 2020, Southeast Asia (US\$16.9 billion) became the BRI's largest investment destination, accounting for 36 percent of the total investment (Rogozhina, 2021).




Figure 3: Trend of BRI investment in South Asia

As shown in Figure 3, investment data show that, like trade patterns, the Southeast Asian market has become more important to BRI investment, (Gong, 2019), especially since the pandemic.

c) Focus on long-term results despite unexpected interruptions

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sparked considerable worldwide discussion about its political-economic consequences and hazards. Chinese funding for BRI has slowed since 2018, and lockdowns during the COVID-19 outbreak have aggravated already-significant delays in infrastructure projects. The BRI will remain a cornerstone of China's diplomatic and economic policy, with a strategic emphasis on Southeast Asia. Post-COVID economic constraints and infrastructure investment will push ASEAN to engage more closely with China.

d) China manages doubts, misinformation, and critiques with evidence of success

In this aspect, the broader scope of investments and developmental projects under the BRI in the Southeast Asian countries have led to rumors and allegations that China is on a mission to gain a strategic advantage in these nations, based on loans and plans to seize strategic assets if a country fails to abide by the repayment agreement (Alex He, 2020). Also, the fact that China is confronted with allegations and misinformation that they are not transparent in its investments and projects does little to help relegate the case. According to many commentators, the BRI project has established China as the dominating player in Southeast Asia, and it will also allow China to exert influence in other parts of the globe (Heiduk & Sakaki, 2019). Another issue that ASEAN members were concerned about was China's strategy of debt trap diplomacy (Lai et al., 2020). This place the nations involved in debt to China (Baviera & Arugay, 2021). Because BRI is a large-scale project, the economic returns on investments in such a large-scale project are risky. Many experts argued that "China loan interest rates are not cheap for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Such worries among Southeast Asian nations impede China's BRI project's implementation in other areas. These nations' mistrust also hampered the BRI initiative in some manner (Shaikh & Chen, 2021).

However, Thailand, Cambodia, and Malaysia are among the countries that have joined the BRI, for furthering their economic and geopolitical development. The initiative has been heralded for its significance for infrastructure and human development (Arthur & Bennett, 1995). The project has been imperative given the need for infrastructure investment and development in the South Asian countries (Gong, 2019). Through the facilitation of BRI, and the foreign investments being received by the countries under its banner there has been a noticeable revolution in the cooperation, regional, and intended regional connectivity through promotion and progressive integration in the region (Vines, 2018)

Table 1 shows the progress and initiatives in the BRI between governments.

Project Name	Starting Year (as of signing of MOUs)
Sino-Malaysian Kuantan Industrial Park	December 2012
Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SSEZ)	December 2010
Sino-Thai Rayong Industrial Park	March 2006
Longjiang Industrial Park (Vietnam)	2007
Sino-Vietnamese (Shenzhen-Haiphong) Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone	December 2008 (began operations in 2016)
Sino-Indonesian Julong Agriculture Cooperation Zone	2011
Sino-Indonesian Morowali Industrial Park	2009
Sino-Indonesian Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone	November 2007
Vientiane Saysettha Comprehensive Development Zone	June 2010
Mohan/Boten Economic Cooperation Zone	Protocol was signed in 2010 but MOU was signed in June 2014.

Table 1: China-invested economic and trade cooperation zones in Southeast Asia

Many academics also believe that the BRI aided in poverty reduction by stimulating investment in this area. This has pushed the use of human resources as well as finance to boost total trade between nations linked by BRI (Heiduk & Sakaki, 2019). BRI has also established a better infrastructure for increasing transportation for commercial reasons as well as logistics. Different policies and reforms are being implemented, specifically under the BRI, to shield the linked nations from needless protectionism and other political pressures (Gu, 2020). As shown in Figure 4, this has created numerous opportunities, particularly for developing countries, to promote their exports and improve their manufacturing sectors by importing required materials from other countries without regard for external influences such as political, environmental, and social factors, among others (Vines, 2018). This serves to illustrate the relevance of BRI in improving trade conditions amongst BRI-partnered nations (Gu, 2020).




Figure 4: Impact of BRI on global exports

e) China faces challenges through regional cooperation and support.

Along with the benefits of economic and regional growth, BRI projects South Asian countries have faced certain challenges and uncertainties as well such as lack of governance, security concerns, sabotage, terrorism, corruption, and conflict in the South Asian region. China launched the BRI initiative to achieve political and economic influence in many parts of the globe via free trade (Gu, 2020). BRI not only promoted free trade but also aided in the development of improved infrastructure in participating nations (Munguia Vazquez et al., 2020). Initially, it was assumed that BRI was only launched to arise in poor countries. Later, its spread throughout Europe and Africa disproved this assertion. However, the BRI initiative also aided China in engaging with Southeast Asian nations (Heiduk & Sakaki, 2019). At first, most of the nations in this area were first unwilling to participate in BRI because of China's debt policy. However, China altered its investment policies to attract more players to a successful initiative (Munguia Vazquez et al., 2020). This initiative aided in reducing distances between China and Southeast Asian nations, hence enhancing the region's economic development (Heiduk & Sakaki, 2019).

f) Challenges create paradigm shift for China towards a circular economy and sustainable leadership

Many skeptics have also concluded that private enterprises were especially vulnerable because of the BRI's poorer institutional framework. Most BRI destinations have been determined to be vulnerable to various hazards and vulnerabilities as a result of rising terrorism in such locations (Gu, 2020) Other studies have also shown that in such cases, investors often lose both their business and their capital (Vines, 2018). In such cases, the backing of the home government is extremely vital to defend foreign ventures along the routes. Even though several of these nations have been shown to have potential economic development. Given the intertwining of BRI's prospects and hazards, businesses should take key steps with caution to accomplish their objectives. In the case of any BRI development initiatives, proper effort should be done to "identify, avoid, and mitigate" detrimental environmental repercussions,


most likely biodiversity loss, taking into account social and environmental variables (Gu, 2020) This leads to an accurate risk assessment of such initiatives, as well as actions in the case of BRI development projects (Vines, 2018).

Many uncertainties have also been shown to have an influence on BRI projects, leading to a variety of issues. These obstacles might be environmental, such as climate change and glacier conversion to water supplies. Such difficulties may be attributed to both political and socioeconomic causes (Munguia Vazquez et al., 2020). As a result, numerous studies concluded that protection against environmental uncertainties should be addressed not just for BRI projects, but also for internal incompatibilities (Mitchell et al., 2016). The conservation of biodiversity is not regarded as adequate for the legal formation of protected areas, however conserved areas should be considered (Gu, 2020) as are alternative techniques for effective places. To convey the multiple interests and complexity of the BRI project, a landscape vision must be addressed, along with many sociocultural perspectives and values. and relational thinking are increasingly acknowledged as being required for sustainable development, pointing to an approaching paradigm change in sustainability research. (Lahti et al., 2018)

2. *What vital components should be integrated into Global leadership Education with the BRI in Southeast Asia?*

The number of countries with emerging economies is expanding, and so it follows that the demand for leaders who can operate in this global field will increase as well. It can be said that Global leadership education is a high-level skill set that helps prepare students to be effective participants on an international level (Black et al., 1991). Thus, an educated leader will need to have political acumen, cultural sensitivity and expertise, and the ability to learn quickly from new experiences. On the other hand, Education in global leadership is essential because it enables individuals to realize their full potential as future leaders in their various disciplines and domains of endeavor (Heiduk & Sakaki, 2019). Emerging nations have already begun leveraging this capability to increase their influence on a global scale. This is because emerging nations are less burdened by the historical scars of their ancestors and are more focused on the future (Munguia Vazquez et al., 2020). As such, this will allow them to explore more opportunities and creativity in fulfilling their visions for the future.

From the analysis of the previous question, the codes are reused as the point of discussion to further conceptualize the components that are learned from the implementation of BRI in Southeast Asia. GLE must include three key phases of learning; (a) the approach phase; (b) the implementation phase; and the (c) sustaining phase. Each phase is exemplified by the components found in the codes as presented in the previous sections.



Leading an alliance with other countries is an important skill for GLE to have in today's global world. For the approach phase, the first step to forming any type of alliance is establishing contact with another country that has a compatible goal and ideology. As always, it is best to act diplomatically when dealing with other nations - at this stage. Nations can build a formal or informal alliance without initiating violence. The total number of investments indicates the commitment of China to the BRI for southeast Asian countries (Gong, 2019). To understand international trade and investment, Chinese leaders of BRI realize that it is important to first master the language of business.(Heiduk & Sakaki, 2019) They are constantly opening new markets by partnering with each other in different countries. They have also noted that it is important to understand another culture to make major international deals with companies in other countries (Caligiuri & Tarique, 2012).

Secondly, GLE must cultivate the implementation phase where leaders must provide stability while being creative with their solutions at the same time to successfully lead during this period (Hruby et al., 2022). While it has been challenging for the Chinese government to convince countries about BRI, they are also crisis leaders when dealing with unexpected issues such as Covid-19, misinformation, and propaganda lies (H. Liu et al., 2021). Crisis leadership is a term that has become popular and can be defined as events that have the potential to destabilize or undermine the functioning or survival of an entity. As a result, Chinese leaders focus on making necessary decisions to overcome any national and regional obstacles without taking any unnecessary risks. As such, GLE needs to consider the need to integrate further the knowledge of regional cooperation and support(Munguia Vazquez et al., 2020).

Lastly, the enhancement of GLE components should include the idea sustaining phase. With BRI, China needs to champion the idea of a circular economy, as it is defined when the production and consumption of goods and services are designed to be closed loops so that materials can be cycled, reused, and recycled. Sustainable leadership is an economic system in which the growth of corporations if it occurs at all, is balanced with the capacity to maintain

natural capital. In a world where society has evolved into one that is consumerist, materialistic, and wasteful there is still a common misconception that the only way to have a positive impact on society is to become an innovator in the technology or products space.

Discussions and Conclusions

Global Leadership Education has been a topic of interest among scholars in the VUCA environment (Antonacopoulou, 2018). With the rise of globalization, global leadership education has become more relevant. Global leadership education is made up of knowledge and skills that are required for leaders in emerging countries (Turner et al., 2019). It involves sharing ideas, practices, and methods to reach new goals and solve problems – by example. Additionally, learning how to be a good citizen of the world is also embedded in global leadership education (Tolstikov-Mast et al., 2019).

With new countries emerging, the need for good leadership is increasing dramatically. Scholars have posited that the additional benefits of global leadership education are improved emotional and psychological health, higher self-esteem, improved decision-making ability, and higher quality relationships (Innes-Taylor et al., 2019). A further point of controversy is over how to measure which expectations are being met by global leadership education. For example, global leadership education is supposed to have an impact on a student's life. However, there is no concrete way of measuring this. As such, many experts and researchers feel that more work needs to be done in this area so that these questions can be answered with more certainty (Park et al., 2018).

Although all the countries are operating under a global system, each has its own culture, history, and ways of doing things. Global leadership education should strengthen the relationships and cooperation between countries, and this ultimately will enhance their quality of life (Turner et al., 2019). This study has shown that BRI attracts business from other markets that were once foreign but now have become more accessible due to the lessons learned from its leadership strategies (Innes-Taylor et al., 2019; Rogozhina, 2021). As such, these lessons are also important to be incorporated into the knowledge base of global leadership education. Global leadership education should also be flexible to cultural differences since it's based on values that are held universally (Walker, 2018). Ultimately, GLE will allow all people in each country or region, who share similar values, to work together in this growing global community. Moreover, Global leadership education is not just restricted to academia; it's used in many ways including nonprofits, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, governments (Antonova et al., 2020).

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